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CRISIS AND LEGITIMACY: THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS AND 
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT.* By James 0. Freedman. New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 1978. Pp. xi, 324. $15.95. 
The role of administrative agencies in our political process has 
troubled Americans for generations. The government creates more 
and more agencies to counter new social problems, while periodi-
cally the country rises to attack the bureaucratic behemoth that has 
developed. Professor James Freedman, in his book Crisis and Legiti-
macy, analyzes these contradictory impulses. His central thesis is 
that the recurrent crises over administrative law are not isolated phe-
nomena, but evidence of a deeper lack of agency legitimacy. As the 
title suggests and Freedman confirms in the Preface, Crisis and Legit-
imacy has two interrelated themes: (1) "understanding the recurrent 
sense of crisis attending the federal administrative agencies," and (2) 
"developing a theory of the legitimacy of the administrative process" 
(p. ix). Freedman divides his study along these lines. Part I success-
fully distills the common elements in the administrative crisis, but 
Part II only incompletely uses this understanding to develop an af-
firmative theory of legitimacy. 
In Part I, Freedman surveys the historical reaction to administra-
tive agencies. Ever since Congress created a tariff office in 1789, 
scholars, lawyers, and laymen have disparaged administrative agen-
cies. The attacks have been sharp, bitter, and constant. And unlike 
critics of Congress or the courts, agency critics challenge the very 
legitimacy of administrative agencies - their right to exist in a dem-
ocratic society. Because agencies cannot point to the Constitution to 
justify their existence, they must provide another raison d'etre. 
Each generation of critics, asserts Freedman, brands a different 
aspect of administrative structure as the central crisis. Freedman 
identifies five major concerns that have been lightning rods for 
agency criticism. The three attacks that he thinks most serious all 
state that administrative agencies do not conform to ideals of Ameri-
can political structure: (1) agencies violate the separation-of-powers 
ideal by combining legislative, judicial, and executive functions in a 
single agency, or even a single person; (2) agencies violate the judi-
cial norm that trial-like inquiries must precede the government's al-
teration of individual rights; and (3) agencies violate the principle of 
direct accountability of the governors to the governed. Additional 
crises have accompanied (4) delegations of power by legitimate au-
thorities to the illegitimate agencies; and (5) public ambivalence to-
ward economic regulation, public concern with bureaucratization, 
* This book review was prepared by an Editor of the Michigan Law Review - Ed. 
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and public skepticism of administrative expertise. Discussing each 
crisis in a separate chapter, Freedman concludes that none, taken 
alone, properly expresses the problem of agency legitimacy. 
Freedman argues that the "popular version" of the separation-of-
powers ideal, with its rigid compartmentalization of functions, is 
hopelessly nai:ve and clashes with the Founders' sophisticated 
grounding of separation of powers on "a psychological understand-
ing of the nature of man" (p. 17). The Founders felt that power 
should be distributed so that "ambition be made to counteract ambi-
tion" (p. 16).1 As long as unchecked power does not accumulate in 
one agency, or even in several agencies taken together, Freedman 
says, the Founders would approve of combining functions to meet 
practical needs. The popular version, however, sees only that agen-
cies combine powers, and, without understanding the reasons, un-
fairly attacks agencies as illegitimate. 
Freedman likewise finds nai:ve the American faith in the ability 
of courts and their procedures to solve society's problems, a second 
"fixed star in the constellation of American values" (p. 21). Judicial 
procedures are simply not adequate for tasks "more legislative, su-
pervisory, or 'polycentric' in nature" (p. 22). Yet agencies are at-
tacked when they tum to other, more efficient procedures. 
Freedman conjectures that the recent trend toward imposing trial-
type procedures upon administrative agencies reflects societal ten-
sions in the 1960s and 1970s; as social conflict increasingly polarized 
society, the country turned to procedural formality to ensure that the 
government was fairly exercising its power to favor certain groups at 
the expense of others. It is unfortunate that Freedman could not 
comment on the Supreme Court's 1978 Vermont Yankee decision,2 
which abruptly halted this trend toward borrowing trial procedures. 
Freedman also minimizes the alleged administrative noncon-
formity with the third ideal of political structure - political account-
ability. The New Dealers emphasized the need for agency 
independence to protect agency integrity, although Freedman points 
out antecedent Progressive-Era reformers with similar beliefs. More 
recently, however, critics have bemoaned that same independence, 
saying that it allows an uncontrolled bureaucracy to tyrannize the 
majority of citizens. Freedman argues that, in fact, the political 
process does significantly control agency behavior and that the inde-
pendence of agencies may properly stabilize more politically respon-
sive institutions. He points to such widely accepted non-
majoritarian institutions as the cabinet, the congressional committee 
system, the political parties, and the Supreme Court. 
l. Quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (J. Madison). 
2. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 
U.S. 519 (1978). 
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The delegation problem commands more of Freedman's respect. 
He urges courts to insist that Congress, rather than the agencies, re-
solve basic policy questions. Freedman rightly perceives that 
standardless congressional delegations force agencies to make con-
troversial political decisions and diminish the legitimacy of the ad-
ministrative process. But Freedman, like the Supreme Court, is 
unable to articulate a practical test for impermissible delegations. 
He recognizes that Congress sometimes can do no more than create 
an agency to tackle a problem "in the public interest," and cites the 
creation of the Civil Aeronautics Board in 1938 as an example. Thus 
admitting that standardless delegations are sometimes necessary and 
permissible, Freedman can only say that the nondelegation doctrine 
should prohibit Congress from transferring its power "[w]henever 
. . . the Framers regarded the proper exercise of less specific legisla-
tive power as closely dependent upon the unique institutional com-
petence of Congress" (p. 93). The only examples he gives of 
nondelegable powers under his test are Congress's impeachment 
power and the President's pardoning power, hardly examples with 
which to reinvigorate the nondelegation doctrine. 
Unlike the preceding chapters' concern with structural theories of 
government, the final chapter on sources of crisis deals with public 
attitudes. Freedman feels that much agency· criticism stems from 
"public ambivalence toward economic regulation" (p. 31 ). Heavy 
reliance on agencies to guide the economy began with the New Deal, 
but it ''was not the result of any well-thought-out philosophy of gov-
ernmental action" (p. 33). Ever since the New Deal, society has gen-
erally accepted moderate economic regulation, and administrative 
agencies have been the means for carrying out that regulation. Un-
fortunately, says Freedman, this made agencies, as symbols of eco-
nomic regulation, a focal point in debates over the proper amount of 
regulation. These debates often lead to attacks on agency legitimacy, 
although the underlying issue is not the role of agencies in the regu-
latory process, but the extent of regulation itself. 
Public concern with bureaucratization has fostered another crisis 
of agency legitimacy. Freedman describes the life-history of an 
agency as tending toward greater routine and conformity with prece-
dent. As many of our largest agencies are now "mature," Freedman 
states that "Americans are confronted by bureaucracies . . . at virtu-
ally every tum" (p. 37). Attacks on agency legitimacy - both di-
rectly from legal scholarship and indirectly from novels like Catch-
22 - can be seen as revolts of the individual against bureaucracy. 
Freedman sympathizes with such attacks, and endorses programs 
such as Scandinavia's Ombudsman to reduce bureaucracy's "egre-
gious aspects and regressive faults" (p. 43). 
Skepticism of administrative expertise is the final public attitude 
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leading to administrative crisis. Freedman argues that this criticism 
misses the mark. Agency members are rarely expert, but the staffs 
often do have a detailed and perceptive understanding of the 
problems they deal with. Rather than faulting the agency members 
as inept, critics should recognize that members (like judges) serve the 
role of generalists in guiding the narrow expertise of the staff. En-
ergy should be devoted, says Freedman, not to demeaning expertise 
but to "developing institutional methods of placing the expert contri-
butions of an agency's staff in the broader social and political per-
spective of the agency's members" (p. 57). 
Freedman then examines public attitudes toward selected agen-
cies. He contrasts the highly regarded Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) with "perhaps the most consistently and severely 
criticized" agency, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) (p. 97). 
The SEC's legitimacy derives from society's agreement with the 
SEC's basic goals - integrity and openness in the stock markets. 
Furthermore, the SEC regulates a single industry and avoids licens-
ing and rate-making, tasks where private and social goals often con-
flict. In comparison, the FTC, because of its wide jurisdiction, has 
had enormous difficulties in devising clear and forceful standards of 
conduct and in mobilizing public support for its programs. Further, 
its jurisdictional overlap with the Department of Justice's Antitrust 
Division has lowered its budget and quality of appointments. These 
problems have led critics to question the FTC's legitimacy in regu-
lating the economy. 
In the next chapter, Freedman analyzes the mixed results of the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). The 
EEOC's limited success, says Freedman, stems from the public's am-
bivalence (a key word in Freedman's thinking) toward the Commis-
sion's goals. The public supports general statements about ending 
discrimination, but often objects to programs with teeth to imple-
ment those abstract goals. In the final chapter of Part I, Freedman 
briefly analyzes the myriad agency programs for the elderly, and 
suggests that Congress has often delegated tasks that are beyond the 
capabilities of a bureaucracy. 
From Part I, Freedman concludes that each agency crisis ex-
presses a broader malaise: dissatisfaction with the absence of a pop-
u1ar theory to justify the administrative agency. Although each crisis 
emphasizes a specific problem with agency structure, and each can 
be repulsed on its own terms, Freedman predicts that the attacks will 
continue until scholars develop, and the public accepts, an affirma-
tive theory of agency legitimacy. In Part II, Freedman attempts to 
chart such a theory. Unfortunately, the attempt does not live up to 
the promise of Part I. Whereas Part I cohesively analyzes the source 
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of administrative crises, Part II only tentatively develops the affirma-
tive theory, leaving many ideas unconnected to the main themes. 
Freedman theorizes that the search for legitimacy should begin 
by examining the fairness of the procedural rules under which agen-
cies operate. To do this, Freedman turns to the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act (AP A), a charter he greatly admires. In the next five 
chapters, Freedman analyzes how the AP A defines an agency, when 
it requires a hearing, how it ensures an impartial hearing officer and 
separates investigative and prosecutorial from adjudicative func-
tions, and when it disqualifies a decisionmaker for bias. These chap-
ters conclude that the AP A's procedural fairness, tailored to 
individual agency needs, demonstrates the legitimacy of the adminis-
trative system. 
Two factors weaken Freedman's exposition of this affirmative 
theory of legitimacy. First, Freedman inadequately incorporates 
into his theory the political-science literature_ on power and legiti-
macy. A major concern of political science is the interaction be-
tween legitimacy and governmental effectiveness. Incorporating 
ideas from this literature would have added sophistication and depth 
to Freedman's attempt to define the parameters of administrative le-
gitimacy. Although Freedman at several points discusses the work 
of Max Weber, he merely footnotes important contemporary work. 3 
Freedman apparently knows the social-science literature - the 
twenty-five pages of end-notes and eight pages of bibliography are 
admirably wide-ranging - but he often contents himself with dis-
cussing Supreme Court decisions and scholarship more familiar to 
his legal audience, such as that of Alexander Bickel (to whom the 
book is dedicated). 
The second weakness of Freedman's exposition also involves the 
scope of his presentation. Unlike Part I, where he sweepingly can-
vasses the general development of administrative law and scholar-
ship to demonstrate his points, Part II presents Freedman's theory of 
legitimacy through a case study of the APA's relation to the Office of 
Foreign Direct Investments (OFDI). The choice is unfortunate. 
OFDI was "a relatively small administrative agency" (p. 189), cre-
ated in 1968 by the Secretary of Commerce pursuant to President 
Johnson's executive order, and lasting only six and a half years 
before President Ford's administration abolished it. OFDI's origins 
thus differ from the major independent regulatory agencies, which 
were created by Congress and thereby lie more in the legislative-
executive netherworld than the purely executive OFDI. Further, 
OFDI's internal structure differs even from that of other executive 
agencies, such as the old Post Office Department ( one of the few 
agencies on which there has been litigation on the separation-of-
3. E.g., S. LIPSET, POLITICAL MAN: THE SOCIAL BASIS OF POLITICS (1963). 
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functions question). Because of OFDI's unique character, Freed-
man's conclusions about legitimacy are of questionable generality. 
A larger, more "standard" independent agency may have made a 
better subject of investigation. Freedman's choice, I suspect, comes 
not from a desire to present his case most persuasively, but from the 
ease in transferring his Pennsylvania Law Review article on OFDl4 to 
his present work. 
Freedman concludes Part II with five chapters on summary ad-
ministrative action - the authority of agencies, without a prior hear-
ing, to seize goods, take over banks, halt trade in securities, or 
suspend licenses, among other acts. Freedman persuasively argues 
that summary action, a heavy-handed use of governmental power, 
provides a critical test of agency legitimacy. After surveying the con-
stitutional case law on summary action, including the recent Snia-
dach-Goldberg-Arnett5 line of cases, and after discussing problems 
with administering summary action, Freedman suggests methods of 
controlling summary action to maximize the legitimacy of the 
agency. He gives no single prescription or even a new suggestion. 
Rather, he recounts procedures such as providing statutory stan-
dards, issuing rules and reasons, having prior informal discussion~, 
expediting hearings, and allowing judicial review. The key ingredi-
ent for summary-action legitimacy, concludes Freedman, lies not in 
any specific structure, but with conscientious administrators. This 
throwing up of the hands is a disappointing conclusion, and clashes 
with Part II's general theme that fair procedural rules are the crucial 
ingredient for agency legitimacy. 
Crisis and Legitimacy thus has flaws and insights. The most pen-
etrating section of the book, Part I, gives a broad and thoughtful 
survey of the recurring sense of crisis in the administrative process. 
Each attack alone is not convincing, declares Freedman, but together 
they demonstrate society's feeling that administrative agencies are 
illegitimate. To change this feeling, scholars must provide an affirm-
ative theory of administrative legitimacy. In Part II, Freedman 
builds the foundation for such a theory in the generally fair and im-
partial AP A procedures. Although he fails to go beyond this simple 
foundation, he should be thanked for clearing away the underbrush 
of the separate attacks on the administrative process and for demon-
strating the need for others to continue work on a theory of agency 
legitimacy. 
4. Freedman, Administrative Procedure and the Control of Foreign Direct Investment, 119 
u. PA. L. REV. I (1970). 
5. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Snia-
dach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969). 
